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Summary: This is the first in a series of three papers that examines the protections 
available to users of various electronic payment vehicles who fall victim to fraud, 
discover an error on their statement, or have a dispute with a merchant after making 
a purchase. Specifically, it examines in detail the federal and state laws that protect 
consumers in the three situations described above as well as the relevant association, 
network, and bank policies that may apply. The protection information included in 
this paper is derived from a wide range of public and non-public sources, including 
federal and state statutes, consumer-issuer contracts, and interviews with scores of 
payments industry experts. This first paper focuses on the two most widely used 
electronic payment methods: credit cards and debit cards. The second paper in the 
series will examine two newer electronic payment vehicles: ACH debits and prepaid 
cards. The third paper will discuss the broader industry and policy implications of the 
authors’ findings.   1
I. Introduction 
  Never have consumers been confronted with so many options when they reach the 
checkout counter: checks, credit cards, signature-debit cards, PIN-debit cards, prepaid cards, 
“electronified” checks, and cash are some of the ways by which they can effect a purchase. While 
most consumers can appreciate the key functional differences between many of these payment 
methods, it is not likely that they understand all of the consumer-protection-related consequences 
of choosing to use one method over another. For example, most debit card users do not likely 
understand that when they choose between “debit or credit,” they may be making a choice that 
can affect whether they can successfully enlist their bank’s help in resolving a dispute with a 
merchant that arises after the purchase. Similarly, when check writers decide whether to allow a 
merchant to convert or “electronify” their checks, it is not likely that they understand that their 
decision will affect the kinds of protections that will be available to them if a processing or 
posting error occurs. 
Consumers may also be surprised to learn that the payment protections they enjoy are not 
fully enumerated in a single piece of legislation or in the fine print of the agreement they have 
with the instrument’s issuer. Consumer protections derive from a variety of sources, including 
federal law, state law, payment network rules, and internal bank policies. A consumer with a Visa 
credit card, for example, is likely protected by the Truth in Lending Act of 1968 and its 
implementing regulation, Regulation Z, state credit card laws, a host of Visa network regulations, 
and the written and unwritten policies of his card’s issuing bank. Ultimately, for each payment 
card product, there is a complex web of laws, regulations, and policies that can potentially protect 
consumers when they experience a problem. 
This is the first in a series of papers that analyzes the protections that various electronic 
payment systems provide consumers when they encounter three specific problems: fraud, error, 
and dispute with a merchant. The authors chose to focus on these three problems for various 
reasons. First, they are among the most common problems consumers encounter when using   2
electronic payment methods. Second, they are among the few problems that federal law often 
addresses with substantive consumer protections. (Federal law addresses most other consumer-
payment-related concerns with disclosure requirements.)  Third, they are problems that, uniquely, 
are addressed by the industry with voluntary protections that often exceed federal requirements. 
Finally, they are problems that highlight the disparate and potentially confusing nature of 
consumer payment regulation. 
For the purpose of this analysis, fraud occurs when an unauthorized person accesses the 
value associated with a payment vehicle. Error refers to a non-malicious or innocent merchant 
error, such as when a merchant accidentally charges someone twice for a purchase or “mis-keys” 
a transaction (e.g., charging a person $179 instead of $17.90). A merchant dispute is a 
disagreement that arises between a merchant and a consumer after payment has been made for 
goods or services. Such disagreements may arise when a merchant does not deliver goods to a 
customer as promised or when the goods a merchant delivers differ (e.g., in quality, quantity, 
size, or color) from those the consumer had expected to receive. 
This paper’s focus is on two of the most mature electronic payment vehicles: credit cards 
and debit cards. Together, these two payment types facilitate approximately one-third of the $6 
trillion in annual consumer payments.
1 The second paper in this series will focus on two fast 
growing but less mature electronic payment vehicles: the ACH debit (used by many, for example, 
to make utility and mortgage payments) and the prepaid card. The third paper in the series will 
discuss the implications of the findings of the first two papers. Ultimately, the goal of this series 
is to provide a better understanding of the inter-related body of laws and policies that protect 
consumers when they face the most common electronic payment problems. As the means of 
consumer payment shifts from paper to electronics,
2 such an understanding becomes increasingly 
                                                 
1 The Nilson Report, No. 823, Dec. 2004, p. 6. 
2 The recently released Federal Reserve Payment Study explains that, in 2003, the number of electronic 
payments exceeded paper checks paid in the United States. The study (of consumer and business payments) 
reports that there were 43.7 billion electronic payments and 36.7 billion checks paid. Electronic payments   3
important for all those with a stake in the payment system, including consumers, regulators, 
networks, processors, and financial institutions. 
The authors gathered consumer protection information about each payment system 
analyzed in the paper from a variety of public and non-public sources. Details about federal and 
state protections are based on a review of statutes, regulations, case law, and agency 
interpretations. Some of the information regarding payment-network- and bank-provided 
protections comes from public sources, such as web sites, account agreements or contracts, press 
releases, and trade publications. Most of the detailed information about the internal rules and 
policies of banks and payment networks, however, is based on a series of interviews with scores 
of compliance officers, product managers, and attorneys who support the various payment card 
products discussed. The information gathered through the interviewing process was 
independently verified and reviewed by industry experts before inclusion. 
The analysis that follows is organized by payment vehicle type. It discusses the 
applicable federal laws, state laws, payment network rules, and bank policies that aid consumers 
in the three situations described above when they use credit cards and debit cards (including both 
PIN and signature debit). Two appendices at the end of the paper summarize the protections 
according to the type of card. 
 
II. How Consumers Are Protected From Fraud, Error, and Merchant Disputes 
  As described above, there is a complex web of protections that consumers may be able to 
rely on when they fall victim to payment fraud, discover an error, or experience a post-purchase 
dispute with a merchant. Consumers should realize, however, that the source of a particular 
protection (e.g., a federal or state statute, a contract, or an internal company policy) can greatly 
determine the protection’s usefulness. The protections described in this paper that derive from 
                                                                                                                                                 
accounted for 55 percent of non-cash payments in 2003, up from a 42 percent share in 2000. A copy of the 
entire study can be found at http://www.frbservices.org/Retail/pdf/2004PaymentResearchReport.pdf.   4
federal and state law are essentially undeniable. While statutory protections may be open to 
interpretation by the courts, they generally cannot be waived by the consumer or modified 
without legislative action. Protections explicitly described in the contracts between consumers 
and issuers of payment instruments also have the force of law. Contractual protections, however, 
can usually be modified unilaterally by an institution and may be unclear or ambiguous as to their 
scope or application. Payment network rules and internal bank policies that provide protections 
do not have the force of law. Institutions can change these rules and policies without notice to 
consumers and interpret them largely as they see fit. In general, how useful these protections are 
depends on a particular organization’s business model, regard for its reputation, and attitude 
toward customer service. 
In addition to describing the federal and state laws that protect consumers, the following 
analyzes the voluntary protections afforded consumers by the policies of private networks and 
banks. Specifically, it attempts to characterize the general industry practice with regard to 
helping consumers resolve errors, fraud, and disputes with merchants. Obviously, each bank and 
network has its own set of rules and policies, and the reader should not rely on this paper’s 
characterization of these for the purpose of resolving any actual payment problem. In addition, 
the reader should note that this characterization of industry practice is not based on a survey of 
the more than 7500 insured commercial banks in the U.S. or the scores of payment networks in 
existence. Instead, it relies on conversations with many experienced bank and network 
professionals who have a good understanding of how the industry functions. 
 
A. General Purpose Credit Cards 
  The general purpose credit card is one of the most popular electronic payment vehicles in 
the U.S. In 2003, it was used to make 14.8 billion consumer purchases totaling $1.3 trillion.
3 
                                                 
3 The Nilson Report, February 2004, Number 805, pp. 6-9.   5
Almost three in four households own a general purpose credit card,
4 and one in every four dollars 
that consumers spend can be traced to a credit card’s line of credit.
5  
The network- and bank-specific practices discussed in this section pertain to credit cards 
that bear the logo of either Visa or MasterCard (the associations)
6 and are issued by financial 
institutions, such as JPMorganChase, Capital One, or MBNA. In 2003, such “association-
branded” cards were used to effect three-quarters of all general purpose credit card transactions in 
the U.S.
7 This section does not analyze the policies of American Express or Discover, the 
operators of the third and fourth largest general purpose card networks, respectively. The federal 
and state laws discussed in this section, however, apply to all credit cards, regardless of brand. 
Visa and MasterCard facilitate the authorization, clearing, and settlement of the majority 
of credit card transactions in the U.S. (and the world). The two associations essentially connect 
the merchants who accept their branded cards with the banks that issue and service them. (See 
Figure 1 for a simplified illustration of how a credit card transaction is processed.)
8 For a bank to 
issue or a merchant to accept an association-branded card, it must affiliate with the network and 
agree to the rules by which it operates. As discussed below, some of these rules directly benefit 
consumers, and others can be relied on by banks to provide consumers with protections that 
exceed those required by law. 
This section examines the federal and state protections available to users of credit cards 
who experience fraud, an error, or a dispute with a merchant. It also analyzes how the policies of 
the associations and their financial institution members can benefit consumers who face these 
problems. 
                                                 
4 Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., “Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 
Survey of Consumer Finances,” Federal Reserve Bulletin 1, 25 (January 2003). 
5 The Nilson Report, November 2003, Number 799, p. 6. 
6 This paper uses the term “the associations” to reference Visa and MasterCard. This term, however, no 
longer accurately describes MasterCard. In June 2002, MasterCard converted from a membership 
association to a private share corporation. As such, MasterCard now refers to itself as a global payments or 
bankcard “company.” 
7 Together, Visa and MasterCard processed approximately 11.5 billion of the 15.1 billion credit card 
transactions that took place in 2003. The Nilson Report, September 2004, Number 818, p. 7. 
8 In actuality, the associations connect merchants’ banks (not merchants) with the card-issuing banks.   6
1. Truth in Lending Act & Regulation Z
9 
In the late 1960s, Congress concluded that consumers required both assistance in 
understanding important credit terms and protection against various creditor practices it deemed 
unfair. The legislation that Congress subsequently enacted—the Truth in Lending Act
10—aims to 
(i) protect consumers from liability for charges resulting from the unauthorized use of their credit 
cards (i.e., fraud), (ii) require creditors to investigate and promptly correct billing errors that 
consumers allege have occurred in connection with their accounts, and (iii) entitle consumers to 
maintain against a creditor much the same claims that they might assert against a merchant in 
connection with the purchase of defective or otherwise unsatisfactory goods and services. 
Congress charged the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System with the task of 
prescribing regulations that would effectively carry out the purposes of this statute; accordingly, 
the Board of Governors wrote and adopted Regulation Z.
11 This section describes in more detail 
each of the three protective measures specified above. 
The Truth in Lending Act provides a person whose credit card has been lost or stolen—
and who may subsequently become the victim of payment-related fraud—with two principal 
means by which to minimize, or even prevent, any resulting damage that may be done to that 
person’s account. First, the statute limits a cardholder’s maximum liability for the unauthorized 
use of his credit card. Second, the Fair Credit Billing Act,
12 which is a section of the Truth in 
Lending statute, permits a cardholder to invoke the application of “billing-error” procedures in 
order to remedy the results of an unauthorized use of the cardholder’s credit card. 
                                                 
9 This section focuses on the parts of Truth in Lending and Regulation Z that are relevant to fraud, error, 
and merchant dispute. For a thorough analysis of all of the consumer protection laws that apply to credit 
card transactions, see Mark Budnitz, Margot Saunders, and Amy Marshall Mix, Consumer Banking and 
Payments Law (National Consumer Law Center, 2002), pp. 53-68, a book on which the authors of this 
paper have relied extensively. 
10 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2004).  
11 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2004). 
12 15 U.S.C. § 1666 et seq. (2004).   7
With respect to limiting a cardholder’s liability for an unauthorized charge to her account, 
Regulation Z specifically provides that a cardholder’s liability for unauthorized use of her credit 
card—including multiple instances of unauthorized use—may not exceed $50 or, if it is less than 
that, the value obtained by the unauthorized use of the card before the issuer has been notified of 
the card’s loss or potential misuse. For a cardholder to be subject even to this degree of liability 
for the unauthorized use of a credit card, the following must be true: (i) the cardholder must first 
have agreed to accept the card, (ii) the issuer must have notified the cardholder of the maximum 
liability to which she may be subject and how to notify the issuer if the card is lost or stolen, and 
(iii) the issuer must have provided a means—such as the requirement of a signature or the use of a 
PIN—by which to identify the cardholder or an authorized user of the account. This last 
requirement means that in cases in which a credit card is not presented in connection with a 
particular transaction, no liability for the unauthorized charge may be imposed on the cardholder. 
As such, if an unauthorized user with access to a consumer’s account number orders merchandise 
over the telephone or the Internet, the consumer victim is shielded from any liability. 
“Unauthorized use” of a credit card is a category of fraud that is broadly defined in 
Regulation Z. Most generally, the term means the use of a credit card by any person who did not 
have the legal right to do so (and from which unlawful use the cardholder receives no benefit). 
Whether the authority for someone to use a credit card actually exists in any particular set of 
circumstances is a matter to be determined under applicable state law. However, the unauthorized 
use of a credit card typically includes the use of the card by (i) someone who has stolen the card, 
(ii) someone who discovers and unlawfully uses the card’s number, and (iii) someone who is 
authorized to use the card but who uses it improperly (i.e., in excess of the authorization granted 
by the cardholder). 
The card issuer always bears the burden of establishing that any particular use of a credit 
card was in fact authorized by the cardholder or, if the use was unauthorized, that the conditions 
for imposing liability for the charge on the cardholder have been satisfied. Accordingly, the issuer   8
is permitted to conduct a reasonable investigation of a cardholder’s claim that a particular use (or 
series of uses) of his card was not in fact authorized.   
A cardholder from whose account funds have been fraudulently debited by the 
unauthorized use of a credit card may, alternatively, elect to resort to the “billing-error” 
procedures of the Fair Credit Billing Act; these procedures are repeated, though amplified, in 
Regulation Z. When properly invoked, Regulation Z’s “billing-error” procedures require a 
creditor to promptly correct any error in a cardholder’s account without damage to the 
cardholder’s credit rating. These procedures are available to a consumer to resolve all kinds of 
alleged errors in connection with her account, including the appearance on a cardholder’s periodic 
statement of a charge that the cardholder did not make or authorize or did not make in the amount 
or on the date identified on the statement. The “billing-error” procedures may also be employed, 
of course, to resolve a non-malicious or innocent merchant error. 
If a consumer suspects there is an error on her periodic statement, she must provide 
written notice to the creditor within 60 days after the mailing by the creditor of the periodic 
statement (i.e., the bill) that first discloses the alleged error. Notifying a creditor of an alleged 
billing error only orally (i.e., by telephone) does not trigger application of the billing-error 
provisions, nor does it preserve a consumer’s billing-error rights. The consumer’s notice to the 
issuer should identify the consumer’s name and account number and state the consumer’s belief 
that the bill contains an error and the basis for that belief, including the date, type, and amount of 
the alleged error. After providing the creditor with a written billing-error notice, the consumer 
need not pay any portion of the disputed amount, including any related finance or other charges 
that may apply to it.  
The creditor must acknowledge (in writing) receipt of a consumer’s written notice 
alleging a billing error within 30 days, unless the error is investigated and resolved within that 
period. Within two complete billing periods, but in no case longer than 90 days, the creditor must 
either correct the billing error or provide the consumer with an explanation stating why the   9
creditor believes the bill is correct. Pending resolution of a billing-error claim, a creditor may not 
attempt to collect the amount in dispute or make (or threaten to make) an adverse report regarding 
the consumer’s credit standing to any person or report that the consumer’s account is delinquent 
based on non-payment of the disputed amount or related charges.  
If the creditor concludes that a billing error occurred as claimed by the consumer, it must 
correct the error to the consumer’s account and provide the consumer with a correction notice. 
The consumer need not pay any finance charges on the disputed amount. If the creditor 
determines that no error was made, it must send the consumer an explanation of the reasons for 
that finding, including any documentary evidence requested by the consumer, and promptly send 
the consumer a statement of what the consumer owes, an amount that may include any finance 
charges that have accumulated and any minimum payments missed while the disputed amount 
was under investigation. The consumer then has the time usually stated on the account to pay any 
outstanding balance. 
If a consumer purchases defective goods or services using a credit card, whether in 
person or by telephone, through the mail, or over the Internet, and so refuses to accept them, or 
the goods he has purchased are delivered late or never at all, and the merchant who provided, or 
was expected to provide, the goods or services fails to satisfactorily resolve any resulting dispute, 
the cardholder may do one of two things. He may notify the card’s issuer of the occurrence of a 
“billing error,” since this term includes a charge appearing on the cardholder’s periodic statement 
for goods or services that the cardholder had indeed paid for but never received or did not accept 
on delivery because they were not delivered in the condition agreed upon or they differed in some 
material respect from the consumer’s expectations. Alternatively, he may use another provision of 
the Fair Credit Billing Act and assert against the credit card issuer the same claims (except tort 
claims) and defenses arising out of the transaction that he or she would be entitled to assert   10
against the merchant.
13  The claims and defenses available to the cardholder are those available 
under applicable state law.
14 
If the consumer has accepted the merchant’s goods or services but thereafter finds 
himself dissatisfied as to their quality, he is no longer entitled to employ Regulation Z’s billing 
error procedures to remedy his dissatisfaction. He may, however, have a claim against the 
merchant under applicable state law, and, if so, this claim may be asserted against the card issuer. 
The Fair Credit Billing Act permits a cardholder in the two situations described above to 
withhold payment—up to the amount of credit outstanding for the disputed transaction and any 
related finance or other charges—for missing, defective, damaged, or otherwise unsatisfactory 
goods or services purchased with a credit card. However, to assert a merchant-related claim 
against the card issuer, the consumer must satisfy three conditions: (i) he must have made a 
genuine attempt with the merchant to solve the problem he has with the merchandise or services, 
(ii) the amount of credit involved in the disputed transaction must be more than $50, and (iii) the 
disputed transaction must have occurred in the same state as the cardholder’s current designated 
address or, if not in the same state, within 100 miles of that address. The determination of where a 
transaction has occurred (in the case of telephone, mail, and Internet orders, for example) is also 
to be made in accordance with applicable state law.
15 
The good faith attempt a consumer must undertake to resolve a dispute does not require 
any particular action on the part of the cardholder; it does not require, for example, that the 
consumer attempt to seek satisfaction from the manufacturer of the goods involved. Because the 
goods or services must be purchased directly with a credit card, transactions that may otherwise 
                                                 
13 15 U.S.C. § 1666i (2004).  See also Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c) (2004). 
14 Almost every state has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), in some cases with minor 
variations not pertinent here.  Article 2, § 2-601 of the UCC gives buyers the right to reject a tender of 
goods that fail to conform to the requirements of the contract under which they are being purchased.  
Accordingly, a consumer has the right to refuse to pay for goods that are not commensurate with the 
requirements of a contract of sale. Under the Fair Credit Billing Act, the consumer may assert this defense 
(i.e., non-payment based on the goods’ failure to conform to the requirements of the contract for sale) also 
against the issuer with whose credit card the goods were purchased. 
15 In general, under state law, transactions conducted over the phone, by mail, or on the Internet are 
considered to have “occurred” wherever the consumer was physically located when he made the purchase.   11
involve a credit card—to obtain a cash advance to make the purchase at issue, for example—will 
not be covered by this rule. Moreover, purchases made using a debit card or a credit card 
convenience check are also not covered. Finally, should the cardholder elect to pay the amount in 
dispute, he thereby waives any right he may have had under this rule to assert claims or defenses 
against the issuer, though he would not thereby waive his right to assert the occurrence of a 
billing error. 
2. State Statutes That Aid Credit Card Consumers
16 
Regulation Z specifically preempts every state law to the extent that it is inconsistent with 
the regulation’s provisions.  Perhaps partly in consideration of this precept, many states have 
enacted consumer protection legislation that largely tracks the language of the federal Truth in 
Lending Act, but no state has enacted legislation that materially enhances the protective measures 
of this federal law. For example, two states have enacted laws that essentially provide protections 
similar to those of Regulation Z to consumers who experience fraud or a merchant dispute. 
California law provides that a cardholder is liable for the unauthorized use of his credit card only 
if (i) the card is accepted, (ii) the liability is not in excess of $50, (iii) the issuer has given 
adequate notice to the cardholder of this potential liability, (iv) the issuer has provided the 
cardholder with a description of the means by which the issuer may be notified of the loss or theft 
of the card, (v) the unauthorized use occurs before the issuer has been notified that an 
unauthorized use of the card has occurred or may occur, and (vi) the issuer has provided a method 
whereby the user of the card can be identified.
17 Under the law of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, a credit card issuer is subject to all of the defenses of the borrower arising from 
transactions for which the card was used.
18 Other states have adopted similarly worded 
                                                 
16 Whether state consumer protection laws actually apply to most credit card issuers (because of their 
national bank charter) is currently a topic of much debate. For more information about this debate, see 
Mark Furletti, “The Debate Over the National Bank Act and the Preemption of State Efforts to Regulate 
Credit Cards,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper (Mar. 2004).   
17 Cal. Civ. Code § 1747.10 (2004). 
18 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 255 § 12F (2004).   12
legislation, but, again, no state has enacted legislation that materially enhances the protective 
measures set forth in Regulation Z that relate to fraud, error, or a merchant dispute.  
3. Visa and MasterCard Rules 
  While Visa and MasterCard do not directly issue credit cards, they own their respective 
brands and require that their members’ branded card products carry, at a minimum, certain 
consumer protections. These protections, which are not mandated by Regulation Z or other 
federal law, are described in varying levels of detail on both associations’ web sites and in card-
marketing materials. In addition to setting forth minimum consumer protection standards for their 
branded products, the associations maintain agreements with card issuers and merchants’ banks 
that provide card issuers with a variety of rights. Some of these rights, such as the right to reverse 
certain transactions, may indirectly benefit consumers.
19 This subsection analyzes one relevant 
protection that the associations publicly advertise (i.e., zero liability) and another that derives 
from the internal rules and agreements that govern interactions between issuers and merchants’ 
banks on the networks (i.e., chargebacks). 
  The most widely advertised protection mandated by the associations is a “zero liability” 
policy for fraudulent transactions. Both associations require that all of their branded products 
(including credit, debit, and prepaid cards) carry this protection. The policies reduce maximum 
consumer liability for fraudulent charges from $50 (as set forth by Regulation Z) to $0. Visa’s 
web site explains the protection to consumers in this way: “You now have complete liability 
protection for all of your card transactions that take place on the Visa system. Should someone 
steal your card number while you’re shopping, online or off, you pay nothing for their fraudulent 
activity.”
20 MasterCard has an analogous policy, explaining to consumers, “You won't be 
responsible for unauthorized purchases.”
21 
                                                 
19 Details about such internal policies and agreements are not generally made public. 
20 http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/zero_liability.html. 
21 http://www.mastercard.com/general/zero_liability.html.   13
  Both associations place limits on the applicability of these policies. Visa, for example, 
requires that issuers extend zero liability to consumers “unless [the issuer of the card] reasonably 
determines that the unauthorized transaction was caused by the gross negligence or fraudulent 
action of the cardholder—which may include [the cardholder’s] delay for an unreasonable time in 
reporting unauthorized transactions.”
22 Similarly, MasterCard limits its protection to consumers 
who (1) have an “account in good standing,” (2) “have exercised reasonable care in safeguarding 
[their] card,” and (3) “have not reported two or more unauthorized events in the past 12 
months.”
23 Both associations’ policies also seem to apply only when consumers report fraudulent 
use within a certain number of days after the transaction date.
24 (In contrast, there is no time limit 
with Regulation Z’s $50 liability limit.)
25 
The internal association policies and agreements that permit banks to reverse or “charge 
back” a transaction can also be beneficial to consumers. A transaction is typically “charged back” 
after an issuer determines the transaction was erroneous, fraudulent (with the merchants’ bank  
bearing responsibility for the transaction), or not proper because of a dispute between the 
merchant and the consumer. From a credit card consumer’s perspective, the fraudulent and 
erroneous chargeback rights of banks are of little consequence because of the strong protections 
already afforded consumers under Regulation Z and the associations’ zero liability policies.
26 An 
issuer’s right to charge back a transaction in dispute, however, can be of great benefit, particularly 
if the deadline for asserting a “billing error” under Regulation Z has passed or if the transaction is 
                                                 
22 Emphasis added. Quoted portions taken from Visa’s web site at 
http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/zero_liability.html. 
23 Emphasis added. Quoted portions taken from MasterCard’s web site at 
http://www.mastercard.com/general/zero_liability.html. 
24 Based on a survey of various association-branded card products, it appears that issuers have flexibility in 
determining the length of time after the transaction date during which to honor the zero liability policy. 
25 Qualifiers, such as those mentioned in this paragraph, have drawn the criticism of consumer groups. In an 
open letter to Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, consumer advocates argued that “the Visa and 
MasterCard policies have significant exceptions, so that they do not give consumers zero liability in all 
cases.” Open Letter to Alan Greenspan from Gail Hillebrand of the Consumers Union (June 23, 2004) at 
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_financial_services/001205.html. 
26 For card issuers, however, chargeback policies provide an efficient means of allowing issuers to meet 
their regulatory obligations.   14
not covered by Regulation Z’s “claims and defenses” rule. (Transactions that would not be 
covered include the following: those taking place outside of the consumer’s state of residence and 
more than 100 miles from the consumer’s home, those for which the consumer has already paid, 
and those valued at $50 or less.) 
  To understand how issuers’ chargeback rights can be of assistance to consumers who 
have a dispute with a merchant, we must first understand how the chargeback process works.
27 
First, a consumer contacts his issuer to report that he is having a dispute with a merchant over a 
charge. Before initiating the formal dispute process, the issuer will typically ask the consumer to 
attempt to resolve the problem directly with the merchant. If the consumer is not successful, the 
issuer will usually ask him to dispute the charge in writing and provide support for his claim.
28 In 
the case where a consumer is dissatisfied with the quality of a product, for example, the issuer 
may ask for a copy of the sales contract (as evidence of what the consumer was supposed to have 
received) or an appraisal of the quality of the delivered item (as evidence that the item did not 
correspond to what was ordered) or both. If the consumer is not able to support his claim with any 
evidence (either oral or documentary), the issuer may decide not to submit the chargeback.
29  
Assuming that the consumer can support his claim that he, and not the merchant, is the 
injured party, the issuer might attempt to settle the dispute informally by contacting the merchant 
directly. If the issuer’s informal attempt is successful, the parties involved can avoid the fees 
charged by the associations for processing a chargeback (for banks, this fee is around $10 to 
                                                 
27 For a general overview of the chargeback process, see 
http://usa.visa.com/business/accepting_visa/ops_risk_management/chargeback_cycle.html?it=search 
28 The kind of support the consumer must provide the issuer for his claim depends on the chargeback 
category into which his dispute fits. Paymentech, a large merchant processor, lists the following dispute-
related categories on its web site: services not rendered; goods or services not as described by merchant; 
defective merchandise; “claim or defense” (under Regulation Z); cardmember was denied right to return 
item; cardmember cancelled order. See Paymentech’s web site at 
http://site.yahoo.com/bank1/chargebacks.html for more details. 
29 Such evidentiary hurdles can limit a consumer’s ability to get assistance. In February 2004, for example, 
the Philadelphia Inquirer reported that one issuer refused to process a chargeback for a consumer because 
she could not produce a receipt from the transaction. The consumer, who was overbilled, never received a 
receipt because she made her purchase over the phone. Jeff Gelles, “Consumer Watch,” The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, Feb. 29, 2004.   15
$25).
30 If the issuer is not able to resolve the dispute directly with the merchant, the issuer then 
begins the process of having the transaction “charged back” by electronically notifying the 
merchant’s bank and charging it for the amount in dispute. The merchant or its bank then has the 
option of either accepting the chargeback or essentially rejecting it and disproving the consumer’s 
contention. If the merchant rejects the chargeback, the issuer must weigh the proof offered by the 
consumer and the merchant and determine whether to (i) do a “pre-arbitration” (for Visa disputes) 
or a “second chargeback” (for MasterCard disputes) or (ii) notify the consumer that he cannot get 
his transaction reversed. If the issuer decides to charge back the transaction a second (and final) 
time and the merchant again refuses to accept the chargeback, the matter is referred to a panel of 
arbitrators operated by each of the associations. There are two reasons, however, why few 
disputes ever get this far in the process (and why merchants typically accept the second 
chargeback): many merchants view the arbitration process as biased in favor of consumers (even 
though consumers are not directly involved in the arbitration hearing) and both parties dislike the 
arbitration fee of $400 or more that the loser typically pays. 
  In general, the associations allow issuers to process a chargeback up to 120 days after the 
transaction date. Chargeback time frames vary, however, based on the type of transaction 
underlying the dispute. For example, disputes over international transactions and transactions 
involving the delivery of future services (e.g., an airplane ride or a cruise) can be initiated after 
120 days.
31 According to the issuers and merchants the authors interviewed, reputable merchants 
that recognize the legitimacy of a consumer complaint may accept a chargeback on a “good faith” 
basis after the association-mandated time frame has expired. Consumers should also note that 
                                                 
30 Merchants can face onerous fees and risk losing the ability to accept credit cards if too many of their 
transactions result in a chargeback. As such, some merchants welcome the opportunity to directly settle 
disputes. For a description of the rules and fees associated with excessive chargebacks, see Christi Frum, 
“Visa and MasterCard Policies Threaten E-Tailers,” Workz.com, available at http://www.workz.com/cgi-
bin/gt/tpl_page.html?template=1&content=1039&nav1=1&user=cc5b369e490c. 
31 If the disputed charge involves delivery of services in the future, the associations do not begin counting 
the 120 days until the date of service.   16
different chargeback rules apply to disputed services that have already been rendered and that 
cannot be returned (e.g., restaurant services and hotel stays).
32 
  Issuers can also use the chargeback process to reverse erroneous charges (e.g., double 
charges or charges in the wrong amount). In this way, issuers have the option of assisting 
consumers who report errors after the period allowed by Regulation Z (60 days as measured from 
the consumer’s statement date) but before the chargeback period expires (normally 120 days after 
the transaction date).  
4. General Industry Practice with Regard to Credit Card Transactions 
  In their agreements with consumers, issuers generally limit their discussion of error, 
fraud, and merchant disputes to disclosures required by Regulation Z regarding “billing errors” 
and “claims and defenses.” In practice, however, many issuers provide greater levels of consumer 
protection by adhering to (or expanding on) the associations’ zero liability policies, using the 
associations’ chargeback procedures, and implementing other pro-consumer internal policies. 
  One common way that issuers provide greater protection to consumers who fall victim to 
fraud is by enhancing the associations’ zero liability policies. In general, card issuers have 
flexibility in how they implement the associations’ zero liability policies, particularly with respect 
to the length of time for which they will honor them. For example, many issuers will provide zero 
liability for unauthorized use that is reported as many as 90 days after the date of the transaction. 
Some issuers claim that they “never” charge the $50 they are permitted to charge under 
Regulation Z. A minority of issuers, by contrast, will cut off the zero liability protection in 60 or 
fewer days after the date of the transaction. (Regulation Z’s $50 liability cap for unauthorized use 
does not have a time limit.) 
  Interviews revealed that issuers may also provide greater protection than is otherwise 
required by helping consumers resolve disputes that cannot be processed through the 
associations’ systems. An issuer, for example, may contact a merchant on behalf of a consumer to 
                                                 
32 “Some Welcome Chargeback Relief,” Credit Card Management, Nov. 2, 2000, p. 6.   17
see if it can help negotiate an end to a dispute. In some instances, if an issuer believes that a 
consumer’s claim against a merchant is legitimate, the issuer will credit the consumer for the 
disputed amount even if the issuer loses on its claim against the merchant in arbitration. 
Conversely, some issuers, from a consumer’s perspective, are less generous with their chargeback 
rights. Some strictly hold their account holders to the established time frames and limit 
chargebacks to those required under Regulation Z. Others refuse to process chargebacks without 
clear proof from the consumer.  
Overall, there is significant variation in how issuers handle disputes that fall outside of 
Regulation Z. As a general rule, the extent to which an issuer will assist a consumer with a 
dispute is ultimately related to the issuer’s business model and the length and profitability of the 
relationship it has with the complaining consumer.
33 
Finally, banks may help consumers who discover erroneous transactions by taking 
advantage of the associations’ chargeback procedures. In most cases, banks can reverse an 
erroneous transaction up to 120 days after the transaction date. 
5. Comparison of Protections 
Regulation Z provides strong protections for “unauthorized” credit card use by capping 
liability at $50 regardless of when a consumer notifies his issuer of the fraud. As such, the dollar 
value of the associations’ zero liability policies as they apply to credit card transactions is limited. 
The associations’ policies also have restrictions (e.g., consumers “must exercise reasonable care” 
or not be “grossly negligent”) that result in liability protection that is more narrow than 
Regulations Z’s. Some individual issuers expand on the association-mandated protections by 
extending zero liability to all unauthorized transactions regardless of when they are reported.  
While their zero liability policies have a dollar value of up to $50 (because of Regulation 
Z), the associations’ chargeback policies can potentially provide consumers with substantial 
                                                 
33 The cost of processing consumer disputes is a significant one for the card industry. One industry observer 
estimated that issuers spend between $1 billion and $2 billion each year processing them. Diogo Teixeira, 
“Dispute Resolution Needs Web and Some Creativity,” American Banker, Dec. 30, 2002, p. 5.   18
dispute-related protection beyond that afforded by Regulation Z. As described above, Regulation 
Z protects consumers from paying for merchandise or services that are never delivered or not 
accepted (as long as consumers report the problem within 60 days of receiving the statement on 
which the charge appears). Regulation Z also provides “claims and defenses” protection when a 
dispute arises with a merchant if the consumer meets four conditions (i.e., the consumer tries to 
resolve the problem herself, does not pay the issuer for the item, paid more than $50 for the 
disputed item, and purchased the item from a merchant in her state or within 100 miles of her 
home). In situations where there is a dispute that does not meet Regulation Z’s “claims and 
defenses” criteria (e.g., because the consumer already paid the issuer for the charge) or where 
delivery of the product is not an issue, the associations’ chargeback policies may be leveraged to 
obtain a refund for the consumer. Individual issuers may expand on this protection by providing 
consumers with up to 120 days during which to report a problem transaction or by helping settle 
disputes that fall outside of Regulation Z and the associations’ chargeback policies. 
Regulation Z’s strong “billing-error” protection essentially insulates consumers from any 
liability for erroneous transactions, such as those that result from a merchant’s mis-keying an 
amount. The associations’ chargeback procedures, however, can be used to provide billing-error 
protection beyond the 60 days prescribed by Regulation Z to up to 120 days after the transaction 
date. 
Please refer to Appendix A for a chart that summarizes the various protections relevant to 
credit cards. 
 
B. Debit Cards 
  Unlike a credit card, which draws its value from a line of credit extended to a consumer, 
the source of a debit card’s value is a consumer’s checking account. The debit card, which can be   19
used at over 5 million U.S. retailers,
34 recently dethroned the credit card as the most popular form 
of electronic payment (as measured by the number of purchases).
35 In 2003, consumers made 
over 16.2 billion purchases with debit cards, using them to draw almost $600 billion out of their 
checking accounts.
36 Between 1995 and 2003, the percentage of U.S. households that used debit 
cards rose from 20 percent to 54 percent.
37 
  This section focuses on the two different types of debit card transactions: those initiated 
with a signature and those initiated with a personal identification number (PIN). (For a simplified 
illustration of how a debit card transaction is processed, see Figure 2.) While this distinction is 
irrelevant for federal and state law purposes, the two types of transactions are processed over 
different networks with different rules. Signature-based debit transactions are authorized and 
settled through the same networks operated by Visa and MasterCard for credit card transactions. 
Most PIN-based debit transactions, by contrast, are authorized and settled through the regional 
electronic funds transfer (EFT) networks (e.g., Star, NYCE, Pulse) that historically processed 
automated teller machine (ATM) transactions.
38 In 2003, approximately 60 percent of debit 
transactions were signature-based and the remaining 40 percent were PIN-based.  
This section examines the federal and state protections available to consumers of debit 
cards who face fraud, error, and a dispute with a merchant. It also analyzes how the policies of 
banks and the signature- and PIN-based networks can be used to benefit consumers in these 
situations. 
 
                                                 
34 Burney Simpson, “Selling Merchants On PIN Debit,” Credit Card Management (Apr. 1, 2004) p. 28. 
35 Credit cards were used for 14.8 billion purchases, while debit cards were used for 16.2 billion 
transactions in 2003. The Nilson Report, No. 809, April 2004, p. 6. 
36 The Nilson Report, No. 809, April 2004, p. 6. 
37 Christoslav E. Anguelov et al., “U.S. Consumers and Electronic Banking, 1995-2003,” Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, p. 6 (Winter 2004). 
38 For a history and description of the development of EFT networks, see Stan Sienkiewicz, “The Evolution 
of EFT Networks from ATMs to New On-Line Debit Products,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
Discussion Paper (April 2002) available at http://www.phil.frb.org/pcc/workshops/workshop8.pdf.   20
1. Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E
39 
  In the late 1960s, Congress recognized that the explosive growth in the use of electronic 
systems to transfer funds made it imperative that it clarify, and where necessary establish, the 
rights of consumers who elect to take advantage of the benefits of these systems. Accordingly, 
Congress enacted the Electronic Fund Transfer Act.
40 Congress charged the Board of Governors 
with prescribing regulations that would carry out the purposes of this statute and the Board, in 
response, wrote and issued Regulation E.
41 Regulation E, among other things, limits a consumer’s 
liability for an unauthorized electronic fund transfer from his account (provided the consumer 
notifies the financial institution in a timely manner) and establishes procedures that a consumer 
may employ to remedy alleged errors that occur in connection with his account. 
If a consumer’s debit card is stolen and used to initiate an unauthorized electronic fund 
transfer from the consumer’s account, Regulation E provides the debit card holder with two 
means by which to limit or prevent any damage that may subsequently be done to her account. 
The first is described in provisions of the regulation that specifically address consumer liability 
for unauthorized transfers; the second, which applies more broadly to any debit posted in error, is 
described in provisions of the regulation that set forth procedures for resolving consumer-reported 
errors. 
Under Regulation E, an unauthorized electronic fund transfer, including one involving 
the use of a debit card, means such a transfer from a consumer’s account that is initiated by a 
person without the lawful authority to do so (and from which the consumer herself receives no 
benefit). Given this, if a consumer’s debit card has been lost or stolen, whether through fraud or 
robbery, any resulting use of the card is unauthorized. An unauthorized transfer does not include 
                                                 
39 This section focuses on the parts of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E that are relevant 
to fraud, error, and merchant dispute. For a thorough analysis of all of the consumer protection laws that 
apply to debit card transactions, see Mark Budnitz, Margot Saunders, and Amy Marshall Mix, Consumer 
Banking and Payments Law (National Consumer Law Center, 2002), pp. 69-107. 
40 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. (2004). 
41 12 C.F.R. § 205 (2004).   21
an electronic fund transfer that was initiated (i) by a person to whom the consumer voluntarily 
gave her debit card, (ii) with fraudulent intent by the consumer or any other person acting in 
concert with her, or (iii) either erroneously or fraudulently by the account holder’s financial 
institution or its employee.  
A consumer’s liability for an unauthorized withdrawal, or series of related withdrawals, 
from his account using a lost or stolen debit card varies, depending on the circumstances and, 
most important, the degree of promptness with which the consumer reports the loss or theft. 
Regulation E prohibits a financial institution from subjecting a consumer to a greater degree of 
liability for an unauthorized transfer than would otherwise apply because of a consumer’s 
negligent conduct (e.g., writing his PIN directly on the back of his debit card). 
The three tiers of consumer liability that Regulation E has established—which are 
distinguished solely on the basis of the consumer’s promptness in reporting the loss or theft of her 
debit card or an unauthorized debit card transfer—are as follows: The consumer’s liability is 
limited to $50, and may be less, if she notifies the financial institution within two business days
42 
after first learning of the loss or theft of the card.  However, if the consumer fails to alert the 
financial institution within this time frame, her liability may be as high as $500, though, again, it 
cannot exceed the total amount of any actual unauthorized transfers from her account. Moreover, 
a consumer’s liability may exceed $50 up to a maximum of $500 only if the financial institution 
can establish that any transfers made after the expiration of the two business days following the 
date on which the consumer first learned of the loss or theft of the debit card and prior to notice 
being given to it would not have occurred had the consumer notified the institution within that 
two-day period.
43 Finally, if the consumer fails to report an unauthorized transfer that appears on 
                                                 
42 The referenced two-business day period does not include the day on which the consumer learns of the 
loss or theft or any day that is not a business day for the relevant financial institution.  The rule is calculated 
based on two 24-hour periods, without regard to the financial institution’s business hours or the time of day 
the consumer learns of the loss or theft. 
43 The $50 and $500 tiers of liability do not apply when an unauthorized transfer from a consumer’s 
account is made without the consumer’s access device (i.e., when the consumer’s actual card is not lost or   22
her periodic statement within 60 calendar days after the financial institution’s transmittal of the 
statement, the consumer’s liability may be unlimited on transfers made after the 60-day period.
44 
Accordingly, if a consumer fails to provide the appropriate notice to her financial institution once 
she learns of the loss or theft of a debit card or an unauthorized transfer, it is possible that the 
consumer could be liable for the loss of all the money in her account, plus the maximum amount 
of any applicable overdraft line of credit.
45 
Imposition of any liability under Regulation E is conditioned on the issuer of a debit card 
providing some means for those who accept the card to identify the consumer using it. In face-to-
face transactions, merchants typically rely on a consumer’s signature or PIN for this purpose. For 
transactions conducted by phone, through the mail, or over the Internet, however, card issuers 
generally do not provide any means for identifying a consumer. As such, consumers do not face 
any liability under Regulation E’s three-tiered liability scheme for fraudulent purchases that are 
made online or by mail or phone. 
In addition to relying on the provisions of Regulation E that address liability for 
unauthorized use, a victim of fraud can protect himself by complying with the error resolution 
procedures contained in Regulation E. These procedures are described below. 
                                                                                                                                                 
stolen). For example, if a criminal were to create a replica of a consumer’s debit card based on information 
he “skimmed” from the consumer’s card during a legitimate transaction, the consumer would not have any 
liability as long as he reported any resulting unauthorized use within 60 days of being transmitted the 
statement on which the unauthorized charge appeared. 
44 Calculating a consumer’s liability under this three-tiered system can be complicated. Consider, for 
example, a consumer whose debit card is stolen by a thief on a Monday morning. The thief uses the card to 
make one purchase of $200 each day for five days (Monday through Friday). The consumer realizes the 
card is missing on Monday morning immediately after it is stolen but does not report the theft to her issuer 
until early Friday morning (before the thief’s last purchase). The consumer is liable for $50 of the $600 in 
unauthorized purchases made on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday. (This is the case because the “two-
day” period of $50 maximum liability does not include the day on which the consumer discovers the loss.) 
She is also liable for the $200 transfer on Thursday because it would not have occurred had she notified her 
bank in time. She is not liable for the $200 taken on Friday, because she gave her bank sufficient notice to 
stop this transaction from occurring.   
45 Again, the consumer is only liable for unauthorized transfers that occur after the close of the 60-day 
period if the relevant financial institution can establish that the transfers would not have occurred had the 
consumer notified the institution within the 60-day period.   23
Regulation E contains detailed procedures for the resolution of errors related to an 
electronic fund transfer.
46  These procedures require a financial institution to investigate in a 
timely fashion a consumer’s allegation that an error has occurred in connection with her account 
and promptly correct any error that such an investigation substantiates.  Under Regulation E, the 
term “error” is defined to include both an unauthorized electronic fund transfer and an incorrect 
electronic fund transfer to or from a consumer’s account; the term also includes a non-malicious 
computational or bookkeeping error made by the financial institution relating to an electronic 
fund transfer.  
If a consumer believes that an error has occurred in connection with his account, 
Regulation E provides that he should telephone or write his financial institution immediately but, 
in any event, not later than 60 calendar days following the transmittal by the institution of the 
periodic statement that first reflects the existence of an alleged error.  In the notice, the consumer 
is instructed to provide his name and account number and an explanation of why he believes there 
is an error, and, to the extent feasible, the consumer should explain the kind of error that has 
occurred and the dollar amount and date in question. The financial institution may require the 
consumer to submit written confirmation of an alleged error within 10 business days after oral 
notification to the institution. If a consumer’s debit card has been lost or stolen, the consumer, in 
reporting the loss or theft, is well advised to simultaneously allege the possible unauthorized use 
of the card as a result of the loss or theft.
47 
The financial institution must promptly investigate an alleged error and resolve it within 
45 days.  However, for the resolution of errors that involve a point-of-sale debit card transaction 
or that were not initiated within the U.S., the financial institution may take up to 90 calendar days 
                                                 
46 12 C.F.R. § 205.11 (2004). 
47 Even if a consumer is not certain that an unauthorized use of his or her debit card has occurred, the 
Official Staff Commentary appears to suggest that a financial institution need not comply with Regulation 
E’s error-resolution procedures unless the allegation of unauthorized use is made. Accordingly, it appears 
to be a simple exercise of common sense to make the allegation of unauthorized use. Official Staff 
Commentary on Regulation E § 205.11(a)-3.   24
to complete its investigation.  If the financial institution elects to take longer than 10 business 
days to conduct its investigation of an alleged error, generally it must provisionally credit the 
consumer’s account in the amount in question (including any applicable interest) while it 
continues the investigation.
48  Within three business days after completing its investigation, a 
financial institution must notify the consumer of its results. If the institution determines there was 
an error, it must correct it promptly by, for example, making a provisional credit final.  If it 
determines there was no error, the financial institution must explain in writing why it believes no 
error occurred and notify the consumer that it has deducted from her account the amount of any 
provisional credit made during the investigation. A consumer may request, and the institution 
must promptly furnish, copies of the documents on which the institution relied in the conduct of 
its investigation. 
It is noteworthy that the kinds of errors that Regulation E addresses are confined to errors 
involving electronic fund transfers to or from a consumer’s account.  That is, Regulation E’s 
error-resolution procedures are of no assistance to a consumer who has purchased allegedly 
defective goods or services using a debit card and who attempts unsuccessfully to resolve any 
resulting dispute directly with the merchant.  This contrasts sharply with the provisions of 
Regulation Z, which permit a consumer who uses a credit card to purchase allegedly defective 
goods or services to maintain against the card issuer the same claims and defenses that he would 
have against the merchant (subject to certain limitations).   
2. State Statutes That Aid Debit Card Consumers 
  Regulation E preempts state laws that are inconsistent with its provisions, but it 
specifically provides that a state law that is more protective of consumers than is Regulation E is 
                                                 
48 The section of Regulation E that requires issuers to provisionally credit a consumer for the full amount 
(plus interest) of an alleged error (§ 205.11) appears to conflict with the section that permits the imposition 
of three tiers of liability (§ 205.6). This conflict raises the following question: Is a consumer who asserts 
that a fraudulent charge is an “error” liable to the extent permitted by the section of the regulation that sets 
forth the three-tiered liability structure? Stated differently, can a consumer avoid all liability for a 
fraudulent charge by asserting that the charge is an error as defined in section 205.11 (as opposed to 
asserting that it is simply an unauthorized transaction under section 205.6)?    25
not preempted.
49 A few states have enacted legislation that satisfies this requirement. For 
example, Kansas law provides that a consumer’s liability for an unauthorized transaction or series 
of transactions by a machine readable instrument shall not exceed $50, unless the consumer fails 
to notify the creditor within four business days after learning of the loss or theft of a debit card.  
The same Kansas statute then provides that a consumer’s maximum liability for an unauthorized 
transaction shall not exceed $300.
50 A few other states have also acted to limit a consumer’s 
maximum liability in connection with unauthorized withdrawals from her account. For example, 
Massachusetts law provides that a consumer is liable for any unauthorized electronic fund 
transfers arising from a single loss or theft of the access device up to a maximum of $50; the 
issuer of the access device must also have provided the consumer with a self-addressed, pre-
stamped notification to be mailed by the consumer in the event of the loss or theft of the access 
device.
51 However, beyond modest expansions of the time permitted to furnish notice of a lost or 
stolen debit card, or a lower maximum liability in connection with the loss or theft of a debit card, 
states generally have not enacted legislation that enhances the consumer protection measures 
contained in Regulation E.   
3. Visa and MasterCard (Signature Debit) Rules 
  Debit card transactions that are signature based (i.e., initiated with a signature) essentially 
have the same two protections mandated by Visa and MasterCard (the associations) that extend to 
credit card transactions: zero liability and chargeback procedures. As in the credit card context, 
both can help consumers who experience fraud, discover an error, or have a dispute with a 
merchant. 
The associations’ zero liability policies, described in detail in section II.A.3 of this paper, 
apply to fraudulent signature debit transactions in the same way they apply to fraudulent credit 
                                                 
49 Of course, other federal statutes may explicitly preempt, or be interpreted by the government agencies 
charged with their enforcement, or by the courts, so as to preempt relevant consumer protections adopted 
under state law.  
50 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 9-1111d (2004). 
51 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 167B § 18 (2004).   26
card transactions. As long as consumers meet certain association-mandated criteria (e.g., they 
exercise “reasonable care” in the handling of their card), they will be absolved of any liability in 
the event their card is misused. In the credit card context, as mentioned above, the dollar value of 
this protection is limited to the $50 not covered by Regulation Z. For debit card users, however, 
the zero liability policy can have greater dollar value. This is due to Regulation E’s tiered liability 
structure which imposes up to $500 of liability for unauthorized use that goes unreported for 
more than two days and unlimited liability for unauthorized use that goes unreported for more 
than 60 days (as measured from the statement date on which the fraudulent use first appears).
52 
In addition to offering enhanced liability protection, as compared to Regulation E, the 
associations’ zero liability policies provide for faster re-crediting of fraudulently withdrawn 
funds. As described above, Regulation E requires that issuers provide consumers with a 
“provisional credit” for any unauthorized transactions that have not been resolved within 10 
business days of receiving notice from the consumer. The associations’ zero liability policies, 
however, require that provisional credits for reportedly unauthorized signature debit transactions 
be issued within five business days. 
Signature debit card users can also benefit from the chargeback rights of their cards’ 
issuers. As described in the credit card section of this paper, agreements between issuers, 
merchants, and merchant banks permit issuers to reverse or charge back certain transactions. 
While consumers do not have any formal right to use the associations’ chargeback procedures, 
issuers will often initiate a chargeback in an effort to assist consumers who discover an error or 
who are involved in a merchant dispute. For example, if a consumer discovers an error on his 
                                                 
52 Of late, the associations have been aggressive in their marketing of “zero liability,” emphasizing how it 
protects consumers who choose to shop online with their signature debit card. Some legal experts contend, 
however, that the associations’ policies do not provide on-line shoppers with any liability protection 
beyond what they already have under Regulation E. Regulation E imposes the three-tiered liability scheme 
only when an issuer has the “means to identify the consumer,” such as a signature or PIN. For an online 
transaction, where neither a PIN nor a signature is typically captured, Regulation E essentially already 
provides consumers with “zero liability.” See, e.g., James L. Brown, “Federal Law Gives Cardholders Zero 
Liability on Web,” American Banker (Mar. 26, 2004) p. 11.   27
debit card statement and reports it to his issuer after the 60-day Regulation E time frame, issuers 
may still help the consumer resolve the error by charging it back to the merchant. In general, 
issuers have the option of doing this for up to 120 days (as measured from the date of the 
transaction). In addition, if a consumer has a dispute with a merchant, her card issuer can rely on 
the chargeback process to reverse the transaction and credit the consumer’s account—something 
issuers are not required to do under Regulation E. Overall, the chargeback rules that apply to 
signature debit card transactions mirror those that apply to association-branded credit card 
transactions. Please refer to section II.A.3 for more detail about these rules. 
4. EFT Network (PIN Debit) Rules 
  The regional EFT (PIN debit) networks, such as Star, NYCE, and Pulse, do not have 
analogs to the associations’ zero liability policies or dispute-related chargeback procedures. Such 
protections, the networks would likely assert, are not necessary because of the security and 
structure of the PIN debit system. 
For the purpose of this analysis, there are two key differences between the PIN and 
signature debit payment methods. The first relates to the authentication of transactions and the 
second to card acceptance. Unlike their signature-based counterparts, PIN-debit transactions 
require “two token” authentication. The first token is something the consumer possesses (i.e., the 
card itself), and the second is something only the consumer knows (i.e., the PIN). Because it is 
more difficult for thieves to obtain this second token from a victim (as compared to forging a 
victim’s signature), there are allegedly far fewer incidences of unauthorized use in the PIN debit 
system as compared to the signature debit system.
53  
                                                 
53 While logic and anecdotal evidence support the contention that PIN debit losses are much lower than 
signature debit losses, it is difficult to find data that address this issue explicitly. An executive at one large 
PIN debit network believes that PIN-based debit card fraud is “insignificant” compared to signature-based 
debit card fraud. Signature debit proponents argue, however, that their use of real-time, online authorization 
and neural networks that can detect and prevent fraud help close the perceived gap in security between 
signature and PIN.   28
The other key difference is the type of merchants that will accept each system’s 
transactions. In general, signature debit is accepted by all merchants that accept credit cards, 
including online retailers, department stores, and restaurants. PIN debit, by contrast, cannot 
currently be used for most internet purchases and is accepted only by merchants that have devices 
that can capture consumers’ PINs.
54 Historically, PIN debit was most popular among merchants 
that operated on relatively thin margins, such as grocery stores and gas stations. However, 
because of differences in how much it costs merchants to accept the two products (PIN is 
cheaper), PIN debit acceptance is growing.
55 
 The two major differences between PIN  and signature debit likely affect the kinds of 
network- and association-mandated protections the products carry. Regional PIN debit networks, 
for example, do not require banks to provide consumers with zero liability protection. Proponents 
of regional PIN debit would likely argue that such protection is less necessary because the 
incidence of PIN debit fraud is very low. In addition, regional PIN debit networks do not provide 
consumers with protections related to merchant disputes. The networks would likely contend that 
such protection is less necessary because of the face-to-face nature of all PIN debit transactions. 
They also would likely assert that the associations’ chargeback policies primarily help consumers 
who do not receive goods they purchase over the phone or over the Internet—a problem PIN 
debit users do not face.
56 
While the regional EFT networks do not mandate zero liability or provide comprehensive 
chargeback rights, they do allow banks to “return” erroneous transactions. In general, banks have 
between 120 and 180 days from settlement date (depending on the network) to initiate such a 
                                                 
54 The PIN debit networks have introduced some “PIN-less” debit products that can be used on the Internet. 
Such products, however, are typically used for payments to entities, such as utility or mortgage companies, 
that have other ways (beyond the use of a PIN) of authenticating a consumer’s identity online. 
55 For example, Credit Card Management reported in October 2004 that Gap Inc. began accepting Pulse 
and other PIN debit brands in all of its clothing stores. 
56 According to one regional EFT network, if it begins supporting the use of PIN debit over the Internet, its 
rules will likely be modified to provide consumers with protection against non-delivery of goods.   29
return. Banks can use this return policy to allow consumers more time (as compared to 
Regulation E) to report errors. 
  The rules described above apply to transactions processed by the regional PIN debit 
networks. The regional networks process approximately 85 percent of all PIN debit transactions 
at the point-of-sale. Most of the remaining 15 percent is processed by Interlink, a national PIN-
debit network owned by Visa.
57 Interlink rules that address how errors are processed essentially 
mirror those of the regional networks, permitting returns for up to 120 days after the date of the 
transaction. Interlink’s fraud and dispute rules, however, are more similar to the rules that apply 
to Visa signature debit transactions. In the case of fraud, banks that accept Interlink transactions 
must provide the same zero liability protection that Visa mandates for all of its card products. In 
the case of a merchant dispute, Visa recently announced that PIN debit users (whose transactions 
terminate at their bank over the Interlink network) will have access to the same chargeback 
policies that apply to signature debit transactions.
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5. General Industry Practice with Regard to Debit Card Protections 
  As a result of differences among the various network and association rules and the 
complexities of the PIN- and signature-debit card products, the additional consumer protections 
that banks explicitly offer their debit-card-carrying customers vary widely. 
  In their agreements with consumers, all banks printed the language required by 
Regulation E describing unauthorized use and its associated three-tiered liability structure (i.e., 
$50/$500/unlimited). Most banks also explained how consumers using signature debit could be 
shielded from any liability imposed by Regulation E if they met the associations’ zero liability 
criteria. Beyond this, the authors observed much variation among banks’ disclosures as to how 
zero liability was implemented and the extent of its reach. For example, the most generous banks 
                                                 
57 The Nilson Report, No. 809, April 2004, p.7. 
58 Prior to December 2004, the Interlink network, much like the regional EFT networks, did not give banks 
access to any non-error chargeback procedures. Industry observers speculate that Visa’s change in position 
could cause the regional EFT networks to offer some type of analogous procedures to its bank customers. 
David Breitkopf, “Will Visa’s Dispute Rule-Change Be Copied?,” American Banker, Dec. 3, 2004, p. 6.   30
provided zero liability for 60 days, extended the policy to PIN debit transactions, promised to 
provisionally credit consumers within one business day, and did not place any additional limits on 
the types of “unauthorized use” the policy covered. Other banks provided zero liability protection 
for fewer days (e.g., for two days with $500 liability thereafter), limited zero liability exclusively 
to signature debit transactions, promised to provisionally credit consumers within five days only 
for signature-debit transactions, placed additional limitations on the types of unauthorized use 
that their zero liability policies covered, and required signed affidavits to begin processing a 
fraudulent claim. Overall, the fraud protections banks disclosed in their contracts with customers 
varied greatly. 
  According to industry experts, the fraud protections that banks explicitly describe in their 
contracts are not as generous as the fraud protections that they actually afford consumers. For 
example, one large regional EFT network reported to the authors that an internal survey it 
conducted found that every one of their 20 largest financial institution customers expanded the 
scope of zero liability to cover PIN debit transactions. In addition, banks claimed that while they 
may promise five-day provisional crediting, they credit 90 percent of customers within 48 hours. 
Finally, banks said they will typically honor the zero liability pledge for the same amount of time 
during which they must limit liability under Regulation E—60 days. 
  As described above, merchant disputes are handled very differently by the PIN  and 
signature debit systems. The regional PIN debit networks do not permit a transaction to be 
charged back to the merchant.
59 As such, banks that rely on regional PIN networks for transaction 
processing cannot provide PIN debit users with any merchant dispute protection (unless a 
merchant voluntarily cooperates with the issuer in order to help the consumer). The associations’ 
signature debit networks and now Interlink, by contrast, permit banks that issue debit cards to use 
the same chargeback procedures available to credit card issuers. As in the credit card context, 
                                                 
59 As noted above, this may change. Shazam, the ninth largest EFT network, announced in December 2004 
that it will follow Interlink’s lead and offer chargeback procedures to its bank customers. Ibid.   31
whether a bank will process a chargeback for a consumer is ultimately at the discretion of the 
bank. In their agreements with consumers, some debit card issuers explicitly inform consumers 
that any disputes that arise with a merchant must be settled directly with the merchant. Most debit 
card issuers, however, do not explicitly address dispute procedures in their consumer agreements. 
In practice, debit card industry experts assert that chargeback protection is made available to 
signature debit card users just as it is to credit card users. In most cases, as long as consumers 
meet the associations’ evidentiary requirements (described in section II.A.3), issuers will attempt 
to assist the customer by charging back the disputed transaction. As described in the section on 
credit card disputes (II.A.4), a bank’s willingness to process a chargeback may depend on its 
business model and its relationship with the individual customer requesting assistance.  
  The strength of Regulation E’s error protection coupled with the associations’ and 
networks’ internal policies leave little room for banks to provide consumers with much additional 
protection in the event of error. In general, banks will return an erroneous charge for as long as 
association or network rules permit, which usually ranges between 120 and 180 days after the 
transaction settles. 
6. Comparison of Protections 
  Regulation E protects consumers who discover unauthorized debit card use with three 
tiers of liability ($50/$500/unlimited) that vary based on when the fraudulent use is reported to 
the issuer. Some states build on this protection by either extending the period of reduced liability 
(e.g., from two days to four) or further reducing a consumer’s total exposure (e.g., from $500 to 
$300). The card associations go further by voluntarily providing zero liability for unauthorized 
signature debit card use (and Interlink PIN debit card use). The associations’ zero liability 
policies, however, apply to a narrower range of fraudulent use claims than does Regulation E. In 
addition, the associations permit banks to determine the period of time during which zero liability 
applies (e.g., for two days or 60 days). Some debit card issuers extend the association protections   32
by honoring zero liability for extended periods of time or extending zero liability to regional EFT 
network PIN debit transactions. 
  Regulation E provides very strong protections (essentially “zero liability”) to the debit 
card user who discovers an innocent error on her statement and reports it to her issuer within 60 
days of receiving that statement. The associations, EFT networks, and banks extend this 
protection by generally providing consumers with more time (between 120 and 180 days) to 
report the error. 
  Regulation E does not give debit card users the right to get assistance with merchant-
related disputes from their debit card issuer. The associations’ rules, however, permit banks to 
charge back signature debit transactions and Interlink PIN transactions if they choose. Regional 
EFT network PIN debit transactions, however, do not have an analogous feature. In general, 
banks will assist a signature debit user and an Interlink PIN debit user engaged in a dispute with a 
merchant by initiating a chargeback when there is sufficient proof that such a chargeback is 
appropriate. 





Despite the nearly identical appearance of credit and debit cards, users of these two products 
are afforded vastly different sets of federal protections when they encounter instances of fraud, 
error, or a dispute with a merchant. Credit card users benefit from a federal scheme of regulation 
that is arguably more generous and protective than that afforded any other payment mechanism. 
This federal scheme, embodied in Regulation Z, shields consumers from liability for all but $50 
of the financial damage that may result from the fraudulent use of their credit cards (regardless of 
when a consumer reports the fraud), permits consumers to assert merchant-related claims against 
their credit card issuers, and provides for the prompt investigation of erroneous charges. The   33
associations and financial institutions that issue these products, presumably driven by competition 
and other market forces, have enhanced these federal protections by further limiting liability (to 
$0 in some instances) and by permitting consumers to request transaction reversals (i.e., 
“chargebacks”) when a purchase does not meet their expectations. Taken together, the mandatory 
and voluntary protections provided to credit card users who experience fraud, error, and dispute 
shield consumers from virtually any liability in connection with each of these common payment-
related problems. 
Debit cards, by contrast, are protected by a federal scheme that assists consumers to a lesser 
degree and in fewer situations. Regulation E, the federal regulation that applies to debit cards, can 
leave consumers exposed to unlimited liability for fraudulent card use and provides no protection 
for consumers who experience a merchant dispute. To a large extent, however, debit card issuers 
and the associations have voluntarily closed the protection gap between credit and 
signature/Interlink PIN debit with internal policies, including zero liability and chargeback 
procedures. 
Notwithstanding the card industry’s efforts to make credit and debit card protections more 
uniform, the laws and regulations that apply to these two products remain complex, and the 
internal policies that apply to them are largely inaccessible to the general public. The protections 
that derive from federal law, for example, are complex in part because they are subject to a series 
of (sometimes puzzling) exceptions and conditions. Similarly, the few protections that card 
issuers explicitly advertise are complex because they are conditioned on consumers’ meeting 
standards that are ambiguous and open to broad interpretation by card issuers (e.g., consumers 
exercising “reasonable care” or not being “grossly negligent”). In addition, details of the network 
and association rules that determine whether issuers can provide protections beyond those 
mandated by federal regulation are essentially secret.  
Overall, this paper finds that the consumer protections associated with credit and debit cards 
are complicated, largely inaccessible, and disparate. Such a finding raises a number of important   34
policy-related questions. For example, what are the implications of federal laws that protect credit 
and debit cards, two products that look nearly identical, in fundamentally different ways? What 
are the costs and benefits of the current regime of protection? What impact do mandatory and 
voluntary protections have on the card industry’s market structure? Policy-related questions such 
as these will be addressed in the third paper in this series.  35
Figure 1: Simplified Illustration of the Typical Credit Card Transaction* 
 
This is a highly simplified illustration of a typical credit card transaction. The dotted arrows 
represent the authorization process (steps 2 through 4), by which the merchant obtains clearance 
to charge the consumer’s credit card account. The solid arrows represent the clearing and 
settlement process (steps 5 through 7), by which the merchant receives payment from the 
consumer’s credit card issuer.  
 
 
* For more detailed information about credit card transaction processing, see David Evans and Richard 
Schmalensee, Paying With Plastic (MIT Press, 2000), pp. 7-10.
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Cardholder presents card to merchant for payment. 
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Figure 2: Simplified Illustration of the Typical Debit Card Transaction* 
 
This is a highly simplified illustration of a typical debit card transaction. The dotted arrows 
represent the authorization process (steps 2 through 4), by which the merchant obtains clearance 
to charge the consumer’s checking account. The solid arrows represent the clearing and 
settlement process (steps 5 through 7), by which the merchant receives payment from the 
consumer’s bank.  
 
 
* For detailed information about debit card transaction processing, see Fumiko Hayashi, Richard Sullivan, 
and Stuart E. Weiner, A Guide to the ATM and Debit Card Industry (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 
2003), pp. 57-68. 
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Cardholder presents card to merchant for payment. 
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Appendix A: Summary of Credit Card Protections Related to Fraud, Error, and Merchant Dispute 
  Federal Law 
(Regulation Z) 
State Law 
(Various State Statutes) 
Association Rules
+  General Industry Practice
+* 
 
FRAUD: Caps liability for fraudulent 
transactions at $50, regardless of 
consumer’s negligence in handling 
card. Liability limits apply regardless 
of when the consumer ultimately 
reports the fraud. Limits liability to 
$0 for mail, phone, and Internet 
charges that are fraudulent. 
Relevant state statutes 
mirror federal law as to 
fraudulent use. 
Zero liability policies require issuers to 
shield consumers from any liability for 
fraudulent use. Policies, however, are 
subject to various association- and bank-
imposed limitations. 
Many issuers will honor the 
associations’ zero liability 
policies for 90 days or more. A 
minority will assess the $50 
permitted by Regulation Z 
after 60 or fewer days. 
ERROR: Requires card issuers to 
investigate and resolve a consumer’s 
claim that a transaction is in error. 
Consumers must notify issuers of the 
suspected error within 60 days of 
receiving the statement on which the 
alleged error appears.  
State statutes generally do 
not address this specific 
situation. 
“Chargeback” policies permit issuers to 
assist consumers who discover erroneous 
transactions for up to 120 days after the date 
of the transaction. 
Issuers will generally leverage 
the “chargeback” procedures 
of the associations and assist 
consumers who discover an 
error for as long as they are 
permitted (i.e., 120 days). 
DISPUTE: Permits consumer to 
assert that a charge for goods that 
were never delivered was an “error,” 




















DISPUTE: Permits consumer to 
assert merchant-related claims against 
the card issuer as long as the 
consumer (i) has not yet paid for 
charge, (ii) made a good faith attempt 
to settle dispute, (iii) lives in same 
state as or within 100 miles of the 
merchant, and (iii) paid more than 
$50 for the item. 
In some states, a creditor 
in a consumer loan 
transaction is subject to 
all of the defenses of the 
borrower arising from the 
consumer sale for which 
the proceeds of the loan 
were used. 
“Chargeback” policies permit issuers to 
return a transaction if a dispute arises up to 
120 days after the date of transaction. While 
ultimately done at the issuer’s discretion, 
dispute-related chargebacks may not be 
subject to the same distance or amount 
limitations as the Regulation Z “claims and 
defenses” protection. 
Most issuers will leverage the 
associations’ chargeback 
procedures to assist a 
consumer who is in a dispute 
with a merchant as long as the 
consumer provides sufficient 
proof of her claim. If the issuer 
cannot charge back the 
transaction, it may call 
merchant directly and attempt 
to settle dispute on behalf of 
the consumer. 
+ Please note, these protections are provided by card issuers/networks on a voluntary basis and do not have the force of law. Issuers or networks can generally change them 
unilaterally or decide not to abide by them.  
* Information only intended to give the reader an idea of general industry practice. Consumers should consult their individual bank’s policies for further information.   38
Appendix B: Summary of Debit Card Protections Related to Fraud, Error, and Merchant Dispute 
  Federal Law 
(Regulation E) 
State Law 







FRAUD: Limits liability to $50 if 
consumer reports loss/theft of card 
within 2 days of learning of it and 
$500 if consumer reports after 2 days 
but within 60 days of being sent 
statement reflecting fraudulent 
transaction. Consumer’s own 
negligence is not a factor in assessing 
liability. Limits liability to $0 for 
mail, phone, and Internet charges that 
are fraudulent. 
Beyond modest 
expansions of the time 
permitted to furnish 
notice of a lost or stolen 
card, or a lower 
maximum liability, states 
generally have not 
enhanced the consumer 
protection measures 
contained in Regulation E 
Signature Debit and Interlink: Zero liability 
policies require issuers to shield consumers 
from any liability for fraudulent use. 
Policies, however, are subject to various 
association- and bank-imposed limitations. 
Regional EFT Network PIN Debit: Policies 
require no additional protection. 
Practices vary. The most 
generous issuers provide $0 
liability for 60 days for PIN 
and signature debit. Others 
provide $0 liability for as few 
as 2 days for signature debit 
only. 
ERROR: Permits consumers 60 days 
from statement date during which to 
notify bank about an erroneous 
transaction. 
State statutes generally do 
not address this specific 
issue. 
Signature Debit and Interlink: 
“Chargeback” policies permit issuers to 
return erroneous transactions for up to 120 
days. 
Regional EFT Network PIN Debit: Network 
rules give issuers 120 to 180 days from 
settlement date (depending on the network) 
to return erroneous transactions. 
Most issuers will return an 
erroneous transaction for as 
long as they are permitted 
under applicable network rules 
(120 to 180 days). 
FRAUD & ERROR: Requires banks 
to investigate claims in a timely 
manner and provisionally credit if 
investigation exceeds 10 days. 
State statutes generally do 
not address this specific 
issue. 
Signature Debit and Interlink: Requires 
banks to provisionally credit within 5 days. 
Regional EFT Network PIN Debit: Policies 
do not require faster provisional crediting. 
Practices vary. Some issuers 
promise to provisionally credit 
immediately. Most credit 




















DISPUTE: Does not address 
merchant disputes or claims. 
State statutes generally do 
not address this specific 
issue. 
Signature Debit and Interlink: 
“Chargeback” policies permit issuers to 
return a transaction if a dispute arises up to 
120 days after the date of transaction. 
Chargeback is ultimately done at the 
issuer’s discretion. 
Regional EFT Network PIN Debit: 
Policies do not provide dispute protection. 
Most issuers will leverage the 
signature debit and Interlink 
chargeback policies to assist a 
consumer who is in a dispute 
with a merchant as long as the 
consumer provides sufficient 
proof of her claim. 
+ Please note, these protections are provided by card issuers/networks on a voluntary basis and do not have the force of law. Issuers or networks can generally change them 
unilaterally or decide not to abide by them. 
* Information only intended to give the reader an idea of general industry practice. Consumers should consult their individual bank’s policies for further information. 